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excellent considering the court's statement in Sides that in cases of
doubtful applicability, the rule should be resolved against the munic-
ipality. 50
F. JOSEPi TREACY JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Apportionment of Disabilities Is
Limited Under the North Carolina Act
The purpose' of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act2 is to relieve employees injured in industrial accidents from the cost
of their resulting disabilities by passing the cost on to the consuming
public.3 To effectuate this purpose the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina has adopted a policy of liberal construction of the Act, particularly
of the coverage clauses 4  In Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co.,5
a case of first impression,6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that a disability resulting from an industrial accident aggravation
of a previous non-compensable injury cannot be apportioned under
the North Carolina Act: the employer is responsible for the entire
disability.7 In so holding, the court followed the rule adopted by
50. 287 N.C. at 25, 213 S.E.2d at 304.
1. The North Carolina Act itself contains no statement of purpose; the purpose
may be inferred from the critics' discussions of the North Carolina Act and the Work-
men's Compensation Acts generally. See note 3 infra. The North Carolina Supreme
Court has spelled out the purpose of the Act in several decisions, e.g., Barnhardt v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966); Lewis v. W.B. Lea To-
bacco Co., 260 N.C. 410, 412, 132 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1963); Kellams v. Carolina Metal
Prods., Inc., 248 N.C. 199, 203, 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1958).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1972), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975).
3. ComrmissioN OF THE AMEwICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION: REPORT UPON OPERATION OF STATE LAws 13 (1914); Malone, The Limits of
Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-the Dual Requirement Reappraised, 51 N.C.L.
REv. 705 (1973).
4. E.g., Hollman v. Public Util. Dep't, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882
(1968); Hall v. Thomason Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 576, 139 S.E.2d 857, 862
(1965); Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 480, 57 S.E.2d 760, 762
(1950) (dictum); Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 192, 41 S.E.2d
592, 597 (1947) (concurring opinion); Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38,
40, 153 S.E. 591, 593 (1930).
5. 27 N.C. App. 254, 218 S.E.2d 876 (1975).
6. No supreme court or appellate court case on the Pruitt issue has been found.
Since the North Carolina superior court decisions and the North Carolina Industrial
Commission decisions are unreported, it is not possible to say with certainty whether
the issue has previously been presented in those forums.
7. 27 N.C. App. at 257, 218 S.E.2d at 878.
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the large majority of jurisdictions." As the dissent in Pruitt pointed
out, however, the effect of the Pruitt decision may be to encourage dis-
crimination in the hiring of handicapped persons and persons with
previous injuries.9  -
The industrial accident in Pruitt occurred when plaintiff employee
suffered a back injury while struggling to dislodge a stuck top from the
gear box of a machine."0 Both sides stipulated that plaintiff's injury
resulted from an accident arising out of, and in the course of, plaintiff's
employment with defendant employer." Plaintiff sustained temporary
total disability for one year, for which the employer compensated him.'
2
A controversy arose, however, over the payment of plaintiff's
permanent partial spinal disability of thirty-five percent. Approxi-
mately ten years prior to the industrial accident, plaintiff suffered a
noncompensable back injury in an automobile accident.' 8 Plaintiff's
doctor testified that the industrial accident aggravated the previous back
injury, and he attributed twenty-five percent of plaintiff's permanent
partial spinal disability to the original back injury and the other ten per-
cent to the industrial accident aggravation of that injury.'
4
In conformity with the doctor's testimony, the hearing commis-
sioner based plaintiff's award on a ten percent permanent partial dis-
ability and the full commission affirmed the award.' 5 On appeal, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with directions to
award compensation for the entire thirty-five percent disability.'6 One
judge dissented from the court's opinion.' 7 The Pruitt decision is the
first that a North Carolina appellate court has rendered on the subject of
apportionment in industrial accident aggravations of previous noncom-
pensable injuries.'" Both the supreme court and the court of appeals,
however, have considered similar issues which bear discussion in
relation to Pruitt.
8. See A. LARsoN, THE LAw OF WO MEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.20, 59.20
(1972; 1976). 11 W. ScHNEiDER, ScHmmE's WoEKMEN's COMBNSATIoN § 2303
(perm. ed. 1957).
9. 27 N.C. App. at 260, 218 S.E.2d at 880 (dissenting opinion).
10. Id. at 255, 218 S.E.2d at 877-78.





16. Id. at 259, 218 S.E.2d at 880.
17. Id. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
18. See note 6 supra.
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In Schrum v. Catawba Upholstery Co."' the Supreme Court of
North Carolina disallowed apportionment in the case of a workman who
had a forty percent uncorrected loss of vision in his right eye due to
astigmatism and then lost the entire vision of that eye in an industrial
accident.20 The court reasoned that since most adults have some
impairment of vision2 and the Act sets out a scheduled payment for
the loss of vision in an eye, 2 an apportionment rule would require
many people to come away with less compensation than the Act pro-
vides.23 Such a result would be inconsistent with the court's policy of
liberal coverage under the Act. 4 The court also pointed out that dis-
allowance of apportionment avoids the necessity of examining into the
condition of every employee's vision who suffers an industrial loss of
vision. 5
In two later supreme court cases, 26 the court in dicta foreshadowed
the outcome of Pruitt. In both cases, the court expressed the view that
an employee should be compensated under the Act for a disability aris-
ing out of his employment, even if the employee's own pre-existing
disease or infirmity contributed to the disability. 7 Each time, how-
19. 214 N.C. 353, 199 S.E. 385 (1938).
20. The court held that the Act of 1929, ch. 120, § 33, [1929] N.C. Pub. L. 131
(now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-33 (Cum. Supp. 1975)), requiring apportionment in certain
circumstances, was inapplicable. Section 97-33 of the General Statutes provides:
Prorating permanent disability received in other employment-If any
employee is an epileptic, or has a permanent disability or has sustained a per-
manent injury in service in the army or navy of the United States, or in an-
other employment other than that in which he received a subsequent permanent
injury by accident.., he shall be entitled to compensation only for the degree
of disability which would have resulted from the later accident if the earlier
disability or injury had not existed.
21. 214 N.C. at 355, 199 S.E. at 387.
22. Section 97-31 of the North Carolina Act (similar to the Act of 1929, ch. 120,
§ 31, [1929] N.C. Pub. L 130-31) in pertinent part provides:
Schedule of injuries; rate and period of compensation.-In cases in-
cluded by the following schedule the compensation in each case shall be paid
for disability during the healing period and ,in addition the disability shall be
deemed to continue for the period specified, and shall be in lieu of all other
compensation, including disfigurement, to wit:
(16) For the loss of an eye, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66%%)
of the average weekly wages during 120 weeks.
(19) Total. . . loss of vision of an eye shall be considered as equivalent
to the loss of such. . . eye. ...
23. 214 N.C. at 355, 199 S.E. at 387.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951) and
Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951).
27. In Vause, the employee's hip injury resulted from an epileptic seizure which
the employee suffered while doing business in his company's truck. 233 N.C. at 89,
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ever, the court found that the claimant was not entitled to com-
pensation on another ground,28 which precluded any consideration of
apportionment. 9
In Wyatt v. Sharp30 the Commission awarded compensation for the
death of the employee when his weak heart gave out after a very minor
fall in the course of his employment.3' The North Carolina Supreme
Court limited its review of the case to the evidentiary question whether
the facts supported the Commission's award.3 2  Its affirmative an-
swer,33 however, necessarily implies that, as a matter of substantive
law, a job-related accident gives rise to compensation even though it
merely aggravates a pre-existing infirmity of the employee. Full com-
pensation was awarded without consideration of the possibility of
apportionment.3 4
Two 1972 North Carolina Court of Appeals cases dealt with the
closely related problem of occupational disease. In Self v. Starr-Davis
Co.3" the court upheld an award of compensation when the employee's
death was caused primarily by a non-job-related tumor and only sec-
ondarily by his industrial asbestosis.3" As in Wyatt,"7 the award was one
of full compensation for the death of the employee and the court did not
discuss the possibility of apportionment at all.38 Apportionment was con-
sidered, however, and rejected in Mabe v. North Carolina Granite
Corp.3" In that case the employee's pre-existing infirmity consisted of
63 S.E.2d at 174. In Anderson, the claimant wrenched his back while lifting a heavy
safe out of a truck. His physician testified that, due to a congenital infirmity of the
spine, the claimant was more prone to receive back injuries than the normal man. 233
N.C. at 373, 64 S.E.2d at 265-66.
28. In Vause, the employee parked the company truck in awareness of the impend-
ing seizure. The court found that by stopping the truck, the employee severed any
causal relation between his employment and the injury. 233 N.C. at 98, 63 S.E.2d at
180-81. In Anderson, the court found no disability, since the employee lost no time
from work or wages as a result of the injury. Therefore, there was lhothing to compen-
sate. 233 N.C. at 375, 64 S.E.2d at 267.
29. It is not clear whether the court's dicta mean that, if no other obstacle to com-
pensation existed, the claimants would be entitled to full compensation or only an appor-
tioned compensation.
30. 239 N.C. 655, 80 S.E.2d 762 (1954).
31. Id. at 657, 80 S.E.2d at 763.
32. Id. at 658, 80 S.E.2d at 764.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 13 N.C. App. 694, 187 S.E.2d 466 (1972).
36. Id. at 699, 187 S.E.2d at 470.
37. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
38. 13 N.C. App. at 696, 187 S.F.2d at 468.
39. 15 N.C. App. 253, 189 S.E.2d 804 (1972).
1126 [Vol. 54
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
his old age and lack of education. 40  When he became forty percent
disabled from industrial silicosis, he could no longer perform the hard
labor that had previously been his source of income.41 Due to his old
age and lack of education, he could get no other type of employment.
42
In affirming an award of one hundred percent permanent disability, the
court of appeals said:
[Ain employer accepts an employee as he is. If a compensable
injury precipitates a latent physical condition, such as heart disease,
cancer, back weakness and the like, the entire disability is com-
pensable and no attempt is made to weigh the relative contribution
of -the accident and 'the pre-existing condition .... By the same
token, if an industrial disease renders an employee actually inca-
pacitated to earn any wages, the employer may not ask that a
portion of the disability be charged to the employee's advanced age
and poor learning on the grounds that if it were not for these
factors he might still retain some earning capacity.43
All of these North Carolina appellate cases demonstrate a strong
tendency on the part of the courts to compensate fully employees for
disabilities caused by industrial accident or disease, even when the
industrial accident or disease is only a secondary cause of the disability
and the primary cause is the employee's own pre-existing infirmity.
Pruitt was the first case to present the court of appeals squarely
with the question whether a disability resulting from the combined
effects of an industrial accident and a previous noncompensable injury
should be apportioned between the two causes under the North Caro-
lina Act, or whether the employer should pay for the entire disability.
The court concluded that apportionment was neither required by the
Act nor proper in Pruitt.44  In support of its conclusion, the court
reasoned that the Act provides compensation for disabilities, which are
defined in terms of loss of earning power.45 Since the employee suf-
fered no loss of earning power until the industrial accident occurred,46
that accident is the sole cause of his disability and he should receive
full compensation for it.47  The court further noted that the majority
of jurisdictions disallow apportionment in a Pruitt situation unless they
40. Id. at 254, 189 S.E.2d at 805.
41. Id.
42. id.
43. Id. at 256, 189 S.E.2d at 807 (citation omitted).
44. 27 N.C. App. at 259, 218 S.E.2d at 880.
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are compelled to require it by express provisions of their Workmen's
Compensation Act.4s Two provisions of the North Carolina Act do
require apportionment; 49 but the court held that they were inapplicable
to the facts of Pruitt.5 ° Since the Act does not expressly provide for
apportionment in a Pruitt situation,51 the court followed the majority
rule. 2
Policy considerations are important when one is construing a
humanitarian statute like the Workmen's Compensation Act. Two
such considerations support the majority's holding in Pruitt. First is the
belief "that industry in general should bear the financial burden of all
industrial accidents rather than the workers who happen to be victims
of particular accidents and that the only way this can be accomplished
is through the agency of the employer who in computing costs and fix-
ing the price of his finished product will include the industrial losses
due to accidents."53 This emphasis on the "financial burden" is
reflected in the North Carolina Act, which provides for the compensa-
tion of "disabilities" anddefines "disability" in financial terms. 4 Not
until an employ( 's earning capacity is impaired is he entitled to com-
pensation. If an employee has a latent physical impairment which does
not impair his earning capacity, then there is no economic loss to be
borne by either the employee or the industry. It is only when an acci-
dent triggers the defect into becoming a disability that economic loss
occurs. If the accident is industrially related, then the purpose of the
Act is served by placing the economic burden on the employer.55
48. Id. at 258, 218 S.E.2d at 879-80.
49. See note 22 supra. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-35 (1972) provides:
How compensation paid for two injuries; employer liable only for sub-
sequent injury.-If any employee receives a permanent injury as specified in
G.S. § 97-31 after having sustained another permanent injury in the same em-
ployment, he shall be entitled to compensation for both injuries, but the total
compensation shall be paid by extending the period and not by increasing the
amount of weekly compensation, and in no case exceeding 500 weeks.
If an employee has previously incurred permanent partial disability
through the loss of a hand, arm, foot, leg or eye, and by subsequent accident
incurs total permanent disability through the loss of another member, the em-
ployer's liability is for the subsequent injury only.
50. 27 N.C. App. at 259, 218 S.E.2d at 880.
51. Sections 97-33 and 97-35, see notes 20 and 49 supra, are the only apportion-
ment provisions in the Act.
52. 27 N.C. App. at 258, 218 S.E.2d at 879.
53. COMMISSION Op THE AmcAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, WORKMEN'S CoMIEN-
SATION: REPORT UPON OPERATION OF STATE LAws 13 (1914).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1972) provides that "[t]he term 'disability' means
incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the
time of injury in the same or any other employment."
55. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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Secondly, the North Carolina Supreme Court has consistently
evinced the policy that "our Workmen's Compensation Act should be
liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for
injured employees or their dependants, and its benefits should not be
denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction."56 As pointed
out in Schrum, an apportionment rule would necessitate an inquiry into
the exact percentage of disability attributable to the employee's pre-
existing defect.5 7  Such a requirement would have caused no problem
in Pruitt, in which there was no lack of apportionment evidence. In a
case, however, in which no apportionment evidence exists, the court
would have either to award full compensation or to deny compensation
altogether. If the court were to adopt the latter rule, then claimants
would be denied the benefits of the Act because of their inability to
produce evidence which is difficult to obtain. If it were to adopt the
former rule, then these claimants would be awarded fuli compensation
whereas the Pruitts (i.e. those who can prove apportionment) would
be denied the full benefits of the statute." Either rule contravenes
the policy of the Act that benefits not be denied on a technical ground.
Judge Clark's dissent in Pruitt points out a countervailing policy
consideration. If the employer must pay for the entire disability when
part of it is traceable to an earlier noncompensable injury, then em-
ployers may protect their pocketbooks by discriminating in their hiring
practices against persons with physicial infirmities. One commentator
suggests that such discrimination is lessened by the fact that the types of
latent infirmities involved in these cases are not visible.59 Many of these
infirmities are visible, however, to a trained medical eye after a
thorough medical examination. Employers can, therefore, avoid high
risk employees by requiring prospective employees to submit to a medi-
cal examination, or by requiring them to provide a complete medical
history. Another way employers may protect themselves is to delegate
previous-injury employees to tasks that are not hazardous to their con-
dition. If the pay-scale corresponds to the risk level of the task, then
the previous-injury employees again suffer from economic discrimina-
56. Hollman v. Public Util. Dep't, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968).
See also note 3 supra.
57. Schrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co., 214 N.C. 353, 355, 199 S.E. 385, 387
(1938).
58. In practice, of course, such a rule would encourage the Pruitts to hide their
apportionment evidence.
59. Note, Workmen's Compensation--Successive Insurers and the Accident Which
Aggravates a Pre-existing Condition, 1956 Wis. L. Rnrv. 331, 333.
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tion. The Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act contains a special
provision designed to discourage the former type of discrimina-
tion.60 North Carolina's Act does not protect against either type of
discrimination.
In other jurisdictions, as in North Carolina, the courts have
rejected apportionment unless the legislature clearly indicated that it
was appropriate. 6' When required, the resulting diminished compen-
sation has usually been mitigated by application of a legislative Second
Injury Fund to the situation. 2 North Carolina has a Second Injury
Fund which supplements the compensation received by employees
under the Act's apportionment provisions.68 The combined effect of
the apportionment provisions and the Second Injury Fund is to compen-
sate fully the injured employee 4 without placing an undue burden on
the employer. In fact, the purpose of these provisions is to relieve the
employer of part of his burden when that burden is too great,
60. Wis. STAT. § 102.31(5) (1973) provides that insurance companies will have
their license revoked if they "encourage, persuade or attempt to influence any employer,
arbitrarily or unreasonably to refuse employment to, or to discharge employees . .. ."
Also, an employer who qualifies for exemption from the insurance coverage requirement
will have that status revoked if he "shall arbitrarily or unreasonably refuse employment
to or shall discharge employees because of a nondisabling physical condition ... 
Wis. STAT. § 102.31(4) (1973).
61. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
62. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 59.20, at 10-268
(1976).
63. Section 97-40.1 of the North Carolina Act in pertinent part provides:
Second Injury Fund-
(b) The Industrial Commission shall disburse moneys from the Second
Injury Fund in unusual cases of second injuries as follows:
(1) To pay additional compensation in cases of second injuries referred
to in G.S. 97-33; provided, however, that the original injury and the subsequent
injury were each at least twenty percent (20%) of the entire member; and,
provided further, that such additional compensation, when added to the com-
pensation awarded under said section, shall not exceed the amount which would
have been payable for both injuries had both been sustained in the subsequent
accident.
(2) To pay additional compensation to an injured employee who has sus-
tained permanent total disability in the manner referred to in the second par-
agraph of G.S. 97-35, which shall be in addition to the compensation awarded
under that section; provided, however, that such additional compensation, when
added to the compensation awarded under said section, shall not exceed the
compensation for permanent total disability as provided for in G.S. 97-29.
Since the Second Injury Fund provision is keyed to the apportionment provisions, the
monies automatically become available to employees who qualify under the terms of sec-
tion 97-40.1.
64. Once found qualified under section 97-40.1, the claimant automatically receives
the difference between what he receives under the apportionment provision and what he
would receive if he were entitled to full compensation. Telephone conversation with Ms.
Christine Denson, Deputy Commissioner, North Carolina Industrial Commission, on
February 25, 1976.
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thus removing any motive to discriminate against the employees who
present the risk of such a burden. 5
The Pruitt situation should fall within the above category. When,
as in Pruitt, a definite percentage of the disability can be attributed to
the prior injury, requiring the employer to compensate the employee
for that portion of his disability seems an undue burden. Moreover, dis-
crimination is feasible in a Pruitt situation because weaknesses due to
prior injuries can readily be discovered by employers and because the
North Carolina Act provides no deterrent to discrimination. Concededly,
the difficulty of obtaining accurate apportionment evidence hinders the
process of making a fair apportionment. The fairest solution seems to
be to put the burden of proving a basis for apportionment on the em-
ployer. The employer would fully compensate the employee unless he
met his burden, in which case he would compensate the employee only
for that portion of the disability attributable to the industrial accident
and the Second Injury Fund would take up the slack. Under this sys-
tem, the employee would be assured of full compensation while the
employer would be given an opportunity to mitigate his burden.
One way of achieving this result is to construe the Act such that
the apportionment and Second Injury Fund provisions are applicable
to the Pruitt situation. The court of appeals, however, properly
rejected this construction, because the plain language of the North
Carolina apportionment provisions clearly does not extend to the Pruitt
situation. Rather, the solution appears to be a legislative amendment
to the Act, bringing disabilities caused by the combined effects of an
industrial accident and a- prior non-disabling weakness within the ambit
of the apportionment provisions of the North Carolina Act when the
employer successfully carries the burden of proving a basis for
apportionment.
HELEN L. WINSLOW
65. 12 W. SCHNEMER, SCHNEIEa'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2544, at 336
(perm. ed. 1959).
1976] 1131

